In a contractual setting, "hard evidence" refers to various actions that a party can take in some states of the world but not in others. For example, a canceled check showing payment may only be available when a buyer has paid a seller. Several recent papers study hard evidence in mechanism design models that treat the cost of disclosing evidence as binary-that is, evidence is costless to present when it is available, but is infinitely costly when it is not available. See, for example, Bull and Watson (2004 and 2007) , Lipman and Seppi (1995), Green and Laffont (1986) , Deneckere and Severinov (2001) , and Forges and Koessler (2003) . In practice, however, there is often a moderate cost associated with disclosing evidence when it is available. For example, it may be costly to locate documents in one's files, to transport physical objects to the external enforcer, or to present documents or testimony. Recent legal scholarship recognizes the practical importance of moderate evidence production cost.
1 Generally, moderate evidence production costs significantly affect the implementation exercise.
I am interested in understanding the effects of moderate evidence production cost on contracting parties' ability to induce incentives in some primary activity such as investment in a production game. I study a complete information setting. Evidence production conveys information to the court about the outcome of the productive activity and it imposes a cost on the players. Not only does this cost matter for players' incentives to disclose evidence, but it also affects the players' incentives in the primary activity.
To illustrate, I consider two versions of a two-player production game in which investment influences the value of production and the players contract so as to shape investment incentives. The two versions differ by whether one or both players is required to make an investment. In some situations, evidence costs can interfere with the implementation of efficient investment. If a player knows that in addition to bearing the cost of investing she will also have to bear the cost to produce evidence that proves she invested, her incentive to invest (and to agree to such a contract) will be reduced. However, in other situations evidence costs can be helpful for implementing efficient investment.
I first study the case where there is no scope for players to renegotiate or settle after the production game and before disclosing evidence. Here, players interact over four periods of time. They first agree to a contract. In the second period, they engage in productive interaction-that is, one or both (depending on the setting) of the players makes her investment decision. Players simultaneously produce costly evidence in the third period, and, in the fourth period, the court imposes transfers on the basis of evidence presented. In the two-sided investment case, evidence production costs can be helpful because they remove resources from the relationship and thus "break the budget." However, in the one-sided investment case, removing resources is generally not helpful for motivating the player who has the investment decision.
I then study the case where players can renegotiate or settle prior to disclosing evidence-that is, the players can renegotiate between periods two and three. As the enforcement phase typically involves the costly production of evidence, settlement is jointly beneficial to the players. The surplus of this renegotiation is the evidence production costs that would be incurred if external enforcement were to occur with the original contract in place.
2 So, in this case, it is the outcome of settlement, which depends upon the actual productive outcome that is realized, that shapes players' incentives during the productive phase of interaction. When settlement is possible, evidence production costs do not have a budget-breaking benefit. With the one-sided investment case, however, settlement can allow for the implementation of investment in situations where it cannot be implemented under non-settlement. However, it is not the case that settlement is always better. I provide conditions under which settlement allows for the implementation of investment in a larger class of one-sided investment games than is possible without settlement.
Since I study complete information settings, this model is, in a sense, one of Nash implementation with renegotiation and, in the settlement case, one with renegotiation taking place before costly evidence is disclosed.
3 However, it is not a standard mechanism-design model because it specifies inalienable costly evidentiary decisions, which may allow for state-contingent evidence sets and for players "forging" evidence at a cost. In terms of mechanism design, this model has fixed message spaces and state-dependent costs of sending messages, which imposes state-dependent constraints on what players can say. Green and Laffont (1986) previously studied a model of this type without moderate cost. Evans (2006) considers costs of sending messages in a mechanism design framework, but those costs do not depend on the state. The focus of his analysis is to show that, with a moderate cost of sending a message, ex post renegotiation essentially does not restrict the set of implementable public action functions. Bull (2006) presents a general model of mechanism design 2 This is because players can avoid the cost of producing evidence by settling prior to litigation. 3 Maskin and Moore (1999) study mechanism design with ex post renegotiation. Their motivating example is also a two-sided production game. However, there the public decision is whether to price at which to trade a good for which the value depends on the seller's investment decision. The buyer may also refuse delivery. I allow also study a setting with interim renegotiation or settlement before evidence is disclosed. I limit attention to simultaneous disclosure of evidence.
with moderate evidence cost.
My focus is on contracting parties' opportunities to present documented evidence, and the cost of doing so. As such, this model differs from other models of court decision making and evidence production.
4 Some more recent papers have analyzed some settings with state-dependant evidence production cost. Sanchirico (2000) models the court's decision as depending upon the evidence presented at trial. In his model, the cost of producing evidence depends upon the state, and evidence can be forged (at a greater cost). The analysis there focuses on a tort setting with two possible states, and is geared towards providing an explanation of the English transition toward a more passive fact-finding jury. Sanchirico and Triantis (2004) consider a contract setting in which a single player presents different levels of evidence that are costly to produce, and all evidence can be forged at a greater cost. They present optimal contracts that induce evidence forgery. I discuss the relation of my modeling exercise to their model in Section 5. Choi and Triantis (2007) study a model with one-sided performance where verification of performance is costly and results in the court observing the true state probabilistically. Deneckere and Severinov (2001) consider a principal-agent setting where the agent communicates with the principal over multiple periods and can send any, and only one, of his messages each period. These messages are basically 4 Classic legal treatments of evidence are Bentham (1827) and Wigmore (1940) . The influence-cost literature studies models in which the probability of a litigant winning at trial depends upon litigants' effort or expenditure (typically on evidence production). Examples of this type of model include Tullo ck (1980), Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) , and Bernardo, Talley, and Welch (2000). Another area of the literature models the court as a Bayesian decision maker who receives signals, which result from effort or expenditure in evidence production, of the defendant's type. See for, example, Rubinfeld and Sappington (1987) . In some settings, such as Sobel (1985) and Shin (1994 and 1998) , the decisionmaker is allowed to reallocate the burden of proof. Modeling the court as a Bayesian decisionmaker may not be appropriate in all settings. See Reinganum and Daughety (2000a) . The strategic search literature treats a litigant's production of evidence as a costly random sample of evidence from a distribution of evidence. A litigant may draw numerous times, but is assumed to present the most favorable evidence. Examples of this approach include Daughety and Reinganum (2000b) , Fro eb and Kobayashi (2000), and Gong and McAfee (2000) . An advantage of this costly sampling approach is that it allows for the consideration of evidence costs. However, it does not address the cost of an individual piece of evidence or the decision to search for particular pieces of evidence. 5 In their model the agent's effort stochastically influences the value of output and the court, after the players incur the cost of going to court, probabilistically observes whether the agent performed. There the cost of dispute resolution influences the principal's decision of whether to take the agent to court. Here I focus on the information content of evidence, and do not model the decision to go to court. However, the cost of producing evidence has a related effect on players' incentives in dispute resolution. the same as the documents presented here. In one part of their analysis, they consider a setting where the agent incurs a cost of lying, but no cost of truth telling. In my model, evidence disclosure by the players occurs simultaneously. This is consistent with much of the literature on evidence production, and I would suggest is an appropriate starting point for understanding the effects of moderate evidence production cost.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, I describe the model of costly evidence production without settlement. In Section 2, I present the motivating investment game examples. I provide a characterization of implementable outcomes in Section 3. I first present the general characterization and then characterize the implementable investment in each of the investmentgame examples In Section 4, I discuss the setting where settlement is possible and present the analogous results for that case. Section 5 contains a comparison of implementability under the non-settlement and settlement cases. Appendix A contains proofs not found in the text.
A Model of Contract, Evidence Disclosure, and External Enforcement
I consider a contractual relationship between two players (also called agents) who interact over four periods of time. In the first period, the players form a contract. This contract has an externally enforced component m which specifies monetary transfers to be compelled by the court in period 4, conditional on evidence presented to the court in period 3. The contract also has a selfenforced component, which specifies the players' individual behavior in the contractual relationship. In the second period, productive interaction occurs, leading to an outcome a which I call the state of the relationship. The state is commonly observed by the players. I let A denote the set of possible states and I assume A is finite. Players receive an immediate payoff given by u : A → R 2 . In period 3 the players simultaneously and independently disclose documents which are presented to the court. I denote player i's grand set of documents by D i . The set of possible document disclosures, or evidentiary decisions, by player i are denoted D i , which is the power set of D i , and includes the empty set (referring to no documents disclosed). Disclosure of evidence is costly, and in some states disclosure of a particular document (that is, making a particular evidentiary decision) may be infinitely costly, whereas it would only involve a moderate cost in other states. 7 An example of this type of cost is that if a party is to produce a canceled check, it may be necessary to locate it in her files. I also allow for the moderate cost of disclosing a particular document to differ between two states (while remaining finite). This allows for the possibility of a player being able to "forge" a document at some cost. I denote the cost to player i of disclosing the set of documents E i in state a by γ i (E i , a), where γ i : D i × A → R + . Documents represent evidence on which the court conditions transfers.
In period 4 the court (or other external enforcer) imposes the transfer m as a function of the documents disclosed by the players. I assume m 1 (E) + m 2 (E)≤0 for any E. Formally, this is a function m : D → R 2 , so for any evidence set E ∈ D, m i (E) is the monetary transfer made to player i. Thus, player i's total payoff in the contract game, if the players go to court, is
Remember that m is jointly selected by the players in period 1. In practice courts generally cannot impose fines (which imposes that a player pay a transfer to a third party) in contract cases. 8 That is, the court can only impose transfers between litigants. This justifies restricting attention to balanced externally-enforced contracts, which are functions of the form m :
I apply the term disclosure rule to any function β: A → D. This function describes how the players behave in period 3, conditional on the state. So that in state a the players disclose documents β(a). Let β i (a) denote the documents presented by player i in state a. I refer to the interaction of players in period 3 and the court imposition of transfers as an evidence production game.
It will be useful to consider the state-contingent payoffs from the start of period 3, holding aside the sunk payoffs from earlier. Given a transfer function m and a disclosure rule β, the period-3 continuation value for player i is given by
I refer to the state-contingent continuation value as a value function and denote 7 This also allows for cost structures where some combinations of documents cannot be disclosed at a finite cost. However, these are not the focus of my analysis here. See Bull (2006) and Bull and Watson (2007) for a treatment of these types of constraints.
8 See, for example, Barnett (1999) . 9 Further, this constraint may reflect the players' ability to renegotiate between periods 3 and 4. Suppose the players can renegotiate the externally-enforced contract m between periods 3 and 4. If their outstanding contract is such that i=1,2 m i (E) < 0 for some E, then following disclosure E the players would re-specify m before the court compels transfers.
it by g : A → R 2 . Note that, because players bear evidence disclosure cost, the value functions are generally not balanced (they do not sum to zero) in each state. An externally-enforced contract m and a disclosure rule βimply the value function g. The following terminology will be useful.
Definition 1 A value function g is implemented by externally enforced contract m and disclosure rule βif g i (a) = m i (β(a)) −γ i (β i (a), a) for every a ∈ A, for i = 1, 2.
I require that players use disclosure rules that induce Nash equilibrium in the evidence production game for all contingencies. Given m, I call β an equilibrium disclosure rule if βspecifies an equilibrium of the evidence production game for every a; that is,
for any E i ⊂ D i , for all a ∈ A, and for each i = 1, 2. I describe the value functions that can be implemented given equilibrium behavior in the evidence production game as follows.
Definition 2 A value function g is called implemented by equilibrium disclosure rule βif and only if there exists an externally enforced contract m such that (i) βis an equilibrium disclosure rule and (ii) g is implemented by m and β.
My analysis focuses on the implementable value functions, which shape players' incentives in the production phase, and the implementable productive outcomes in a motivating production game. I consider whether a value function g can be implemented given a disclosure rule βsince the particular βis crucial in determining which states can be differentiated. That is, the continuation values may differ under different equilibrium disclosure rules because both the cost of equilibrium evidence production and the equilibrium enforced transfers may differ.
Illustrative Examples
I consider a motivating example of a productive relationship to show that evidence is important both because it provides the basis for verifiability and because it serves to "break the budget." Suppose that two players form a relationship and will jointly produce a product. I assume that the value of the product depends on an unverifiable investment of one or both players. I will consider two cases: (a) both players make investment decisions, and (b) only one player makes an investment decision. Investment influences the realization of the value of the product, which can be either high (H) or low (L). I assume that each player receives, just through the production process, a share of the value or revenue from the production. I denote the total value of production by v : {H, L} → R, and player i's share by v i (·), where
To simplify the exposition, I assume that v 1 (H) = 1, and
10 The value of output is verifiable through the use of hard evidence.
Example 1-Two-sided Investment
Consider first the case where both players make investment decisions. Given investment levels, H is realized with probability p(x 1 , x 2 ) and L is realized with probability 1 − p(x 1 , x 2 ), where x i denotes the level of investment by player i. I require that x i ∈ R + . The cost of investing x i is equal to x i and is incurred by player i. I assume that ∂p(x 1 , x 2 )/∂x i > 0 and that
Further, assume that the influence of x 1 and x 2 on p are symmetric.
I assume that the values of v(H), v(L), and p(·, ·) are such that players wish to contract so as to induce a positive value of e i for each player. I denote by x * i the value of x i for each player that solves the joint optimization problem:
Thus, x * is such that
2 ) = 1. For now, I ignore the cost of evidence production for verifying whether the value is H or L. Clearly, efficiency dictates (x * 1 , x * 2 ) and no evidence production. If both players have the incentive to unilaterally deviate from x * i , say by deviating to some x i < x * i , then simply being able to distinguish L from H and impose different transfers following each outcome will not be adequate to implement x * i as in the standard Holmström (1982) result. To see this consider the transfer required to prevent each player from unilaterally deviating from x * i . Since for right now I am ignoring the cost of using evidence to provide information about the realization of H or L, I will write i's transfer m i (·) as a function of the value of the product (H or L). To prevent player 1 from deviating from x * 1 requires
Similarly, preventing player 2 from deviating from x * 2 requires
It's easy to see there is no balanced transfer function m such that this constraint can be satisfied for each player. Since x i < x * i which, by the assumptions above, implies p(
However, this cannot be the case for both players if the m's sum to zero in each state. As the literature has long recognized, it would be useful to be able remove resources from the relationship in some cases to punish both players. This does not necessarily require a harsh punishment for everyone, but, in many settings, may involve each player bearing a relatively small cost. My modest contribution here is to show that evidence production costs can suffice to "break the budget."
Now suppose that player 1 has evidence of L. That is, player 1 has evidence that has a finite cost c > 0 in L and has infinite cost in H. More precisely, player 1 has document d such that γ 1 (d, L) = c and γ 1 (d, H) = ∞. This is the only evidence that player 1 potentially possesses. Assume that player 2 has no evidence in either state. Consider a contract in which player 2 must pay c to player 1 if player 1 discloses evidence d. With the contract and player 1 disclosing evidence d in L, that (x 1 ,x 2 ) is an equilibrium requires the following: (1) ∂p ∂x 1 (x 1 ,x 2 ) = 1, or that player 1 best responds to player 2's level of investment, and (2) ∂p ∂x 2 (x 1 ,x 2 )c = 1, or that player 2 also best responds to player 1's level of investment, which requires that she choose x 2 to maximize
2 ) is close to 1 then the probability of L is low in equilibrium and the outcome is close to efficient overall. So in this setting, moderate evidence production cost improves implementability.
Example 2-One-sided Investment
Now consider a one-sided investment situation, where only one player makes an investment. Here removing resources from the relationship is, generally, not needed because the investing player is motivated by the differences in her payoffs between states-continuing with the previous example, H and L. To see that evidence production cost can hinder implementation, consider the following one-sided investment version of the previous example.
Suppose that player 1 has a binary choice to either make an investment or not; making the investment entails a cost of x < 1 to player 1. For simplicity, assume that investing leads to state H with certainty, and not investing leads to L with certainty.
11 I assume that if the players do not contract that each earns a payoff of zero. Only player 1 potentially possesses any evidence and can produce document d at cost c in state H, but bears an infinite cost of producing d in state L. This is the only evidence player 1 potentially possesses. To induce investment and disclosure of d by player 1 requires
Inducing player 1 to participate, knowing that she will invest, requires
However, inducing player 2 to participate requires
Note that player 1 can be punished with a negative value of m 1 (∅) when L is realized, but player 2's participation constraint prevents player 1 from being rewarded with a positive value of m 1 (d ) when H is realized. This constraint on "rewarding" player 1 in H can affect her willingness to participate. Rearranging and combining the players' participation constraints implies
So for a contract, that provides the incentive for player 1 to invest, to be individually rational for both players requires c≤1 − x. Thus, if the cost of producing d in H is too large, specifically larger than 1−x, investment cannot be implemented.
Characterization
My main technical result characterizes the value functions that can be implemented given a particular evidence cost structure. To calculate the set of implementable value functions, it is useful to analyze equilibrium conditions for a fixed β. For each i, I define
Thus, Λ i (β, E) represents the set of states for which player i can unilaterally reach E when player j discloses documents as prescribed by β. Note that when Λ i (β, E) = ∅, if evidence E is disclosed then it must be that player j deviated from β(though possibly player i deviated as well).
It is useful to consider how equilibrium behavior in the evidence production game is related to a given value function g. The definition of g implies (β i (a), a) .
Given the evidence cost structure, I describe a value function g as being consistent with βif there is an m such that g i (a) = m i (β(a)) −γ i (β i (a), a) for every i and a. That is, such a g can be the result of the disclosure rule βgiven the evidence production cost. I define the following upper bound on m i (E).
I characterize the set of implementable value functions as follows.
Theorem 1 (Characterization) Take as given a disclosure rule βand a value function g that is consistent with β. There exists an externally enforced contract m such that (i) g is implemented by βand m, and (ii) βis an equilibrium disclosure rule, if and only if i=1,2ˆz
i (E;β,g)≥0, for every E ∈ D.
The intuition is as follows. Consider any E ∈ D. If Λ i (β,E) = ∅, since β is an equilibrium disclosure rule and the m's are balanced, there is an upper bound on m i (E) of min
This is an upper bound since in equilibrium player i must not wish to deviate from any β(a). If Λ i (E, β) = ∅, then it must be that player j deviated. When player j has deviated to reach E, equilibrium disclosure imposes no upper bound on player i's transfer at E. This implies that player j, having deviated, can be punished as harshly as needed to induce equilibrium disclosure. A given g can be implemented by βand some m only when the sum of the upper bound on players' transfers is non-negative at every E ∈ D.
12 This characterization 12 I thank a referee for pointing out that Krishna and Perry's (2000) Theorem 2 contains a somewhat similar summation. They show that a budget-balancing mechanism exists if and only if the "optimal Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism" generates a surplus. Their summation is of the expected payments under the optimal Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Here the summation is terms of the players' continuation payoffs and reflects their incentives to deviate from the desired disclosure rule.
applies to a particular β. The set of value functions that one disclosure rule can implement may differ from those that another disclosure rule will implement. This is because different disclosures may distinguish between between states differently, and may involve different evidence production costs.
Returning to Examples
I now discuss the characterization in terms of the motivating production examples. Here, we need to only focus on unilateral deviations from the specified disclosure in H,β(H), and the specified disclosure in L,β(L). For any other evidence disclosure, one of the players can be deterred by a large transfer. This is relatively straight forward for the two evidence environments considered in the previous examples because these environments only have one document, which has a finite cost in only one state, for player 1 and no documents for player 2. Thus, we do not need to be concerned with unilateral deviations from behavior that is prescribed for, at least, some state. After discussing the specifics of each, I study a richer evidence environment in the one-sided investment case.
In the two-sided example (Example 1), the player 1 was to disclose evidence β 1 (L) = d in state L and disclose nothing in state H (β 1 (H) = ∅). The only possible disclosures for player 1 correspond to either β 1 (H) or β 1 (L) and player 2 cannot disclose evidence. So we do not need to be concerned with unilateral deviations from β. However, c, the cost of disclosing d, influences whether the efficient level of investment can be attained.
Next consider the one-sided investment example (Example 2). Recall that only player 1 can ever disclose evidence-she can disclose d at a cost of c in state H, but incurs an infinite cost of doing so in state L. Again, to give player 1 the incentive to invest requires 1−x+g 1 (H)−g 1 (L)≥0. Further, attempting to induce player 1 to invest requires that player 1 have the incentive to disclose d in state H and to disclose no evidence in L. Player 1 will not participate if she is to receive a negative payoff when she invests, assuming investment is induced. That is, it must be that g 1 (H)≥0. So it must be that player 1 receives a transfer of at least x + c − 1 in state H.
We know that player 2 needs to have the incentive to participate, which requires that g 2 (H)≥0. Since player 2 discloses no evidence, we can specify that she pays at most 0 to player 1 in state H. We now know the values of g i (H) that we need to induce for each player to satisfy the participation constraints. However, when c > 1 − x there is not a transfer that makes these values of g i feasible given that we require that d be disclosed in H. That is, there is not such a g that is consistent with the required disclosure rule. So investment cannot be implemented.
I now develop the analysis for the one-sided investment case for a more general evidence environment. Theorem 1 provides a characterization of the implementable value functions that takes the disclosure rule as given. As Example 2 suggests, the specific features of the productive interaction are important in considering the effects of evidence production cost. So I continue with the one-sided case, and denote the players' values in each state as above and continue the assumption that investment by player 1 influences the state in a deterministic manner.
Based on the players' incentives in evidence disclosure, player 1's incentive constraint to invest, and the players' participation constraints, I provide conditions under which investment can be implemented. Player 1's incentive constraint for investment requires
That is, player 1 must do better when she invests than when she doesn't. Each player must receive a payoff of at least zero given equilibrium behavior under the contract with investment occurring. For player 1, this requires
For player 2 this requires
When there is a disclosure rule that, given the evidence cost structure, allows for an m that satisfies these constraints and the players' evidence disclosure incentive constraints, investment can be implemented.
As the intuition for Theorem 1 suggests, the primary concern in evidence disclosure is deviations to (β 1 (H) ∪β 2 (L)) and (β 1 (L) ∪β 2 (H)). Here, I do not focus on specific value functions because I am interested in determining whether investment can be implemented based on whether a disclosure rule with suitable cost properties exists. Given the investment technology, investment can be implemented if and only if there is a disclosure rule with cost properties that satisfy the following three inequalities.
Theorem 2 Given the investment technology and evidence environment, investment by player 1 can be implemented if and only if inequalities (1), (2), and (3) are satisfied for some disclosure rule.
Only when there is an evidence disclosure rule such that inequalities (1), (2), and (3) are satisfies, are there values for m that allow investment to be implemented Note that this requires only the existence of some disclosure rule that satisfies inequalities (1), (2), and (3). Of course, these are more easily satisfied for some ways of distinguishing between H and L. In particular, if player 2 has a document that is costless for her to disclose in L, but is infinitely costly for her to disclose in H (so that (1) and (2) are easily satisfied), investment can easily be implemented by requiring that player 1 pay a sufficiently large transfer to player 2 when player 2 discloses that document. However, if instead the document only has a large finite cost in H, which may be viewed as player 2 having the opportunity to forge the document in H, the implementation exercise is not so easy. Then the needed incentive for player 1 to invest must be balanced against player 2's cost of disclosing the document. That is, if player 1 needs to be punished for not investing an amount that is larger than player 2's cost of producing the document in H, simply imposing that player 1 pay a large transfer when the document is produced will not work. The result deals with these cases. Naturally, the more interesting cases are those that are not binary. Some of those cases would include setting where players can forge evidence. In Section 5 I discuss the situation in which H is positively distinguished from L by evidence being produced in H that is not produced in L.
When Settlement is Possible
So far I have assumed that settlement after the realization of the state and before the evidence disclosure game is not possible. In reality disputes are often settled before going to court (and sometimes even before litigation is initiated). However, I do not attempt to provide a model or explanation of when disputes are settled and when they are not. Instead, I briefly extend T heorem 1 to the case where settlement does occur. I then analyze the effects of settlement on the productive relationship that serves as the motivation for this line of analysis, and extend Theorem 2 to the settlement case.
I now assume that after the realization of the state, but before the evidence disclosure game, the players have the opportunity to renegotiate m. At the end of this period of time the players' renegotiation puts m in place. If the players do not renegotiate, then m ≡m. Renegotiation can be interpreted as pretrial settlement.
13 I assume that the outcome of renegotiation is given by the generalized Nash bargaining solution. Players commonly know the state a and available documents which may be provided in court. Thus, the outcome of external contract enforcement of the initial contract m defines the disagreement point for their bargaining. I denote player i's bargaining weight by π i .
This renegotiation process leads to a state-contingent continuation value function, which is found by working backward from the enforcement outcome with m in place. The players can avoid the cost of evidence disclosure anticipated in the evidence production game, given βand m, through renegotiation. This implies, given a, that players negotiate over how to divide the joint surplus of γ 1 (β 1 (a))+γ 2 (β 2 (a)). The generalized Nash bargaining solution implies that the state-contingent continuation value of player i is given by
Here, value functions are of the form g : A → R 2 0 because transfers are balanced and no evidence production cost is incurred.
Characterization
Here, the definition of g implies
I define the following upper bound on m i (E).
Similarly to before, the set of implementable value functions is characterized as follows.
Theorem 3 Take as given a disclosure rule βand a value function g. There exists an externally enforced contract m such that (i) g is implemented by β and m, and (ii) βis an equilibrium disclosure rule, if and only if i=1,2z
The intuition and the proof are similar to those for Theorem 1 so both are omitted for brevity.
Implementability of the One-sided Investment I now provide conditions for when investment can be implemented in the onesided investment case. These are similar to the case when settlement is not possible. The players' incentive constraints for evidence disclosure are the same as in the non-settlement case because they must have the incentive to actually disclose the specified evidence. However, the incentive constraint for player 1 to invest and their participation constraints now reflect that they settle and divide the evidence production cost savings. So player 1's incentive constraint for investment requires
Player 1's participation constraint, when investment is induced, requires
Player 2's participation constraint, when investment is induced, requires
Given the investment technology and that settlement is possible, investment can be implemented if and only if there is a disclosure rule with cost properties that satisfy the following three inequalities.
Theorem 4 Given the investment technology and evidence environment, investment by player 1 can be implemented if and only if inequalities (3), (4), and (5) are satisfied for some disclosure rule.
Note that inequality (5) is satisfied by the assumption that investment is jointly optimal. The proof of Theorem 4 follows the proof of Theorem 2 and is omitted. The main difference is that the incentive constraint for player 1 to invest and both players' participation constraints differ from the nonsettlement case due to the division of the evidence production cost savings. Thus, inequalities (4) and (5) differ from inequalities (1) and (2). Since, as noted above, players must have the incentive to actually disclose evidence should the evidence disclosure stage be reached, inequality (3) is the same under settlement as it is under non-settlement case.
Settlement vs. Non-Settlement
I begin by discussing the comparison of the value functions that are implementable when settlement (before the evidence production game) is possible and those that are implementable when settlement is not possible. Note that any disclosure rule βand m pair that implement some g under the nonsettlement case also implement some, though generally a different, g under the settlement case. The players must have the incentive to disclose βin the evidence disclosure game, whether it is reached or not-whether settlement is possible or not. However, with settlement the players do not actually bear the cost of disclosing β.
Consider the value functions, under settlement and non-settlement, that are implemented by a particular βand m pair. Given state a, the respective value functions for player i are non-settlement: β 1 (a), a) +γ 2 (β 2 (a), a) ].
So for a given βand m pair and a given state a, the corresponding g i (a) will be larger for each player i with settlement.
This does not, however, provide a clear answer as to whether settlement allows more or less to be implemented. In fact, settlement sometimes improves implementability and sometimes hurts it. Further, as Example 2 shows, for considering a practical application, we ought to consider players' participation constraints. So I continue this comparison by considering the motivating production example, and its associated participation and incentive constraints.
In the case of two-sided investment where each player has the incentive to unilaterally deviate from the optimal level of investment presented in Example 1, settlement does not allow resources to be removed from the relationship. The ability to remove resources, and hence attain unbalanced g's, is needed to implement the optimal investment. So settlement poses a problem in this case.
One-sided Production
I briefly compare the conditions for implementation of investment in the onesided case. Under both settlement and non-settlement, inequality (3) must be satisfied. So I will focus on the two inequalities that differ for each case.
Consider inequalities (2) and (5):
1 − x≥0
Inequality (5) is satisfied by the assumption that investment is jointly optimal. However, inequality (2) requires that investment generate enough surplus to cover the cost of verifying that the state is H because without settlement this cost must actually be incurred. This is makes the non-settlement case more restrictive than the settlement case for low surplus productive technology. Now consider inequalities (1) and (4):
If π 1 = 0, these are identical. Otherwise, either could be more or less restrictive. However, if no evidence is disclosed in L, meaning no cost of evidence disclosure is incurred in L, and π 1 > 0, inequality (4) is less restrictive. So in these cases settlement does better implementing investment. Observation 1 When distinguishing between H and L is based on evidence being presented in H (positive evidence of H) and no evidence being presented in L and π 1 is positive, investment can be implemented for a larger class of investment games under settlement.
However, the opposite is not true. When distinguishing between H and L is based on evidence being presented in L and no evidence being presented in H (and hence no evidence cost being incurred in H) settlement still does at least as well, in terms of implementing investment, as long as π 1 > 0.
Settlement can be Beneficial-Returning to Example 2
Consider a version of Example 2, where x = .5 and c = .8. So investment has a cost of .5 to player 1, and disclosing d in H entails a cost of .8 to player 1. We can see that, in the setting without settlement, we cannot implement investment because x + c = 1.3 > 1.
However, in the setting with settlement, when π 1 = π 2 = 1/2, a contract with m 1 (d ) = .4 and m 1 (∅) = −.6 implements investment by player 1. With these transfers player 1 will disclose d in H. This implies g 1 (H) = .4 − .8 + (.5).8 = 0, and g 1 (L) = −.6. For player 2, g 2 (H) = −.4 + (.5).8 = 0, and g 2 (L) = .6. For player 1 investing yields a payoff of 1 − .5 + 0 = .5, and not investing yields a payoff of 0 − .6 = −.6. So participating and investing is rational for player 1. Since g 2 (H) = 0 participation is also rational for player 2.
Here, the optimal investment can be implemented with settlement, but cannot be without settlement. This is because without settlement giving player 1 the incentive to distinguish state H from state L requires a large enough transfer from player 2 that player 2 will not participate. However, with settlement, player 2 shares enough of the cost savings that she will participate. Note that this example satisfies the conditions of Observation 1.
The Effects of Changes in Cost
I now briefly discuss the kinds of changes in evidence production cost, given a disclosure rule, that are helpful in that they expand the class of production games for which one-sided investment can be implemented. In both settings, settlement and non-settlement, changes in evidence production cost help in similar directions. A decrease in the cost of player i producing β i (H) in state H relaxes inequalities (1), (2) , (3), and, if π 1 < 1, (4). A decrease in the cost to player i of producing β i (L) in state L relaxes inequalities (3) and, if π 1 > 0, (5) . Finally an increase in the cost of producing misleading evidence-that is, (3), and (5).
Given a disclosure rule, disclosing β i (H) in state H and disclosing β i (L) in state L may be viewed as player i being "truthful." Similarly, given a disclosure rule, disclosing β i (H) in state L or disclosing β i (L) in state H may be viewed as player i being "untruthful." So, in the one-sided investment case, raising the cost of players being "untruthful" and reducing the cost of players being "truthful" is useful. However, Example 1 showed this, generally, not to be the case with two-sided investment. This is somewhat related to Sanchirico and Triantis' (2004) main result. They consider a buyer and seller model in which the seller potentially has the incentive to breach due to the realization of her cost of performance. Only the buyer can present evidence for which the realization of the cost structure depends on whether the seller performed. Any evidence can always be produced, but "fabrication" of evidence entails additional cost. Their main result is that the players can minimize ex ante evidence production cost (to implement a given difference in expected transfer) by inducing large actual transfers and evidence fabrication in realizations of evidence cost that occur with low ex ante probability, and low actual transfers and little evidence production for those that occur with high ex ante probability. Here I do not study the probabilistic existence of evidence. My finding that increasing the cost of presenting "untruthful" evidence and decreasing the cost of producing "truthful" evidence is beneficial for implementation has a somewhat similar theme to Sanchirico and Triantis' main result.
Conclusion
I have presented a model of contract enforcement in which verifiability depends upon litigants' costly production of evidence. The model treats evidence as documents, the availability of which are state-dependent. My analysis focused on providing incentives for investment, which influences the value of produc-tion, to be made in a production game. Two versions of the production game were studied. These were first analyzed for when players could not settle before producing evidence. Then the setting with the opportunity for settlement before evidence disclosure is explored. In the first, both players could invest.
In the two-sided investment case studied here, evidence production cost is helpful when the players cannot settle before the evidence disclosure game. This is because evidence production provides a way of removing resources from the relationship. When the players can settle, of course, evidence production cost isn't helpful.
The one-sided case was explored a bit more because implementability of investment under the settlement and non-settlement cases is not as clear as it is for the two-sided investment case studied here. The settlement case saves the players the cost of verifying that the state is H-that player 1 invested. So inducing the players to participate is less restrictive. However, inducing player 1 to invest can be more or less restrictive with settlement.
A Proofs Not in the Te x t
Proof of Theorem 1 (Necessity) Suppose βis an equilibrium disclosure rule, but i=1,2ˆz
i (E;β,g) < 0, for some E ∈ D.
Equilibrium disclosure requires
for some a, β is not an equilibrium disclosure.
(Sufficiency) Take any E ∈ D. That i=1,2ˆzi (E;β,g)≥0, for every E ∈ D implies the existence of an enforced contract m : D → R 2 0 such that g i (a) − γ 1 (β(a)) +γ i (E)≥m i (E) for all a ∈Λ i (β,E), for every E ∈ D, and each i = 1, 2. This implies m i (β(a)) −γ i (β(a)) ≥m i (E i ∪β j (a)) −γ i (E i ∪β j (a)) for any E i ⊂ D i (a), for all a ∈ A, and for each i = 1, 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2
(Necessity) Player 1's incentive constraint for investing is m 1 (β(H)) −γ 1 (β 1 (H), H) + 1 − x≥m 1 (β(L)) −γ 1 (β 1 (L), L).
That is, player 1 must do better when she invests than when she doesn't. Rearranging and combining the participation constraints, using that transfers are balanced, yields −γ 2 (β 2 (H), H)≥m 1 (β(H)) ≥γ 1 (β 1 (H), H) − 1 + x.
Thus to have such an m 1 (H) requires, after rearranging,
For β(H) to be equilibrium behavior in H and for β(L) to be equilibrium behavior in L requires that the following four inequalities hold.
Note that, as with the intuition for Theorem 1, we need only be concerned with deviations to β 1 (L) ∪β 2 (H) and β 1 (H) ∪β 2 (L). In fact, I will focus on the upper bounds for the required transfers in the event of these deviations. (The proof can also be done by adding incentive constraints.)
The upper bound on m 1 (β 1 (L) ∪β 2 (H)) is m 1 (β(H)) −γ 1 (β 1 (H), H) + γ 1 (β 1 (L), H). The upper bound on m 2 (β 1 (L) ∪β 2 (H)) is m 2 (β(L)) −γ 2 (β 1 (L), L) +γ 2 (β 2 (H), L).
Since transfers are balanced, this implies that we need to have m 1 (β(H)) −γ 1 (β 1 (H), H) +γ 1 (β 1 (L), H)≥ m 1 (β(L)) +γ 2 (β 2 (L), L) −γ 2 (β 2 (H), L).
So we need
Similarly, the upper bound on m 1 (β 1 (H) ∪β 2 (L)) is
The upper bound on m 2 (β 1 (H) ∪β 2 (L)) is m 2 (β(H)) −γ 2 (β 2 (H), H) +γ 2 (β 2 (L), H).
Again since transfers are balanced, this implies that we need to have Combining yields
Which implies
This ensures that a suitable value of m 1 (β(L)) exists to satisfy the incentive constraints for evidence disclosure.
Next, consider a condition that ensures existence of an m 1 (β(L)) that is compatible with player 1's incentive constraint for investment. Returning to player 1's incentive constraint for investment, we have m 1 (β(H)) −γ 1 (β 1 (H), H) + 1 − x≥m 1 (β(L)) −γ 1 (β 1 (L), L).
Rearranging yields
From the derivation of inequality (3), we need
So we need
Thus we need 1 − x≥γ 1 (β 1 (H), H) +γ 2 (β 2 (H), H) −γ 1 (β 1 (H), L) −γ 2 (β 2 (L), H)
Thus, the existence of a disclosure rule βsuch that inequalities (1), (2), and (3) are satisfied is necessary for the implementability of investment.
(Sufficiency) Take any v 1 , v 2 , x, D, and γ. That a given βsatisfies inequalities (1), (2) , and (3) implies the existence of an enforced contract m : D → R 2 0 such that player 1's incentive constraint for investment, both players' participation constraints, and both players' incentive constraints for evidence disclosure are satisfied. Thus, investment can be implemented. Q.E.D.
